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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Gathon Dudley Shannon appeals his conviction and 
the sentence imposed on him by the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  Among other 
things, he contends that the government violated his Fifth 
Amendment rights at trial by cross-examining him about his 
post-arrest silence.1  Because we agree that the government 
                                              
1 By “post-arrest” silence, we mean Shannon’s silence 
following his arrest and receipt of the attendant warnings 
under Miranda v. Arizona of his right to remain silent.  384 
U.S. 436, 467-68  (1966).  Shannon also argues that the 
District Court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence 
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violated his constitutional right to remain silent, we must 
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for a new trial.       
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 Whether Shannon’s conviction can stand is contingent 
on whether the constitutional error that infected his cross-
examination was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”2  
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  We 
therefore provide a detailed overview of the evidence 
presented at trial.  
 
 A. Factual History  
 
 In December 2009, the Pennsylvania State Police 
(“PSP”) along with the United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) began investigating an increase in 
                                                                                                     
his two prior convictions despite their being more than twenty 
years old; that it erred in issuing certain supplemental jury 
instructions after the jury had indicated that it was 
deadlocked; and that it violated his Sixth Amendment rights 
by basing his sentence on a judicial finding of fact – which 
implicated a specific statutory maximum and minimum 
sentence – rather than on the jury’s verdict.  We mention 
these issues later, see infra at n.9, but do not decide them 
because the Fifth Amendment violations apparent on the 
record require reversal.   
2 As explained within, the government must “prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did 
not contribute to the verdict obtained,” to sustain the 
conviction.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).  
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cocaine sales across Beaver County, Pennsylvania.  Working 
with confidential informants, the DEA was able to identify 
the local distributor as Adrian Taylor, and, through a series of 
wiretaps, learned that a large shipment of cocaine was 
expected to arrive in Beaver County during the weekend of 
August 20-21, 2011.     
 
 Using traditional surveillance techniques, the DEA 
watched Taylor leave his Beaver Falls home on August 20 to 
collect money from his street-level dealers in anticipation of 
the shipment’s arrival.  According to Taylor – who ended up 
testifying on behalf of the government – he then drove to a 
hotel near the Pittsburgh International Airport carrying two 
bags, one full of cash that he had collected from his associates 
and the other containing items necessary to “wrap” the cash.3  
There, he met with the cocaine supplier, Vincent 
Middlebrooks from Houston, Texas, who counted the cash 
and wrapped it while Taylor waited.  Taylor testified that, 
during drug deals like this, he “always only [met with] 
Middlebrooks.”  (App. at 984.)  According to Taylor, after the 
cash was prepared, Middlebrooks drove to Washington 
County, Pennsylvania, where he was expected to “grab[] the 
coke” and then come back and transfer the drugs to Taylor.  
(Id. at 985.)   
 
 Shortly after midnight the following day, when the 
exchange of drugs for cash was evidently complete, a DEA 
team saw Taylor flag down Middlebrooks at a second hotel.  
The two conversed briefly, and Taylor left and drove home.  
The agents then observed Middlebrooks go back to the first 
                                              
3 “Wrapping” the cash means shrink-wrapping it in 
preparation for exchanging the cash for drugs.   
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hotel.  The next morning, agents saw Middlebrooks return his 
rental car at the Pittsburgh airport and embark on a flight back 
to Houston.   
 
 Given that Taylor had succeeded in bringing multiple 
kilograms of cocaine into Beaver County, the DEA was able 
to persuade a judge that a “roving wiretap” on Taylor’s 
communications was warranted to follow the drugs and 
money and to learn more information about Middlebrooks.4  
In the meantime, by early September, Taylor’s Beaver 
County associates had already sold all the cocaine from the 
August shipment and were, as the government says, 
“clamoring for more.”  (Gov’t’s Br. at 6.)  Taylor thus 
immediately began preparing for the next deal, collecting as 
much cash as he could to bankroll another shipment.   
 
 On September 27, 2011, Taylor texted Middlebrooks, 
asking when the next cocaine shipment was expected to arrive 
in Beaver County.  That was the first communication between 
the two that the government had intercepted.  The two then 
spoke by telephone, with Middlebrooks confirming that the 
next shipment would arrive within two days, on Thursday, 
September 29, 2011.  During that telephone call, in which 
Taylor agreed to buy 16 kilograms of cocaine, Middlebrooks 
confirmed that he would fly to Cleveland, Ohio, on 
September 28 and proceed to drive to a hotel near Taylor’s 
house, where he would spend the night packaging the cash for 
the following day’s deal.   
                                              
4 A regular wiretap involves tapping a particular phone 
whereas a roving wiretap authorizes the government to, in 
effect, tap a person, “intercept[ing] any and all identified 
telephones used by that person.”  (App. at 284.)  
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 On the night of September 28, 2011, DEA agents in 
Cleveland spotted Middlebrooks as he deplaned from a flight 
inbound from Houston, walking with a black roller-bag.  The 
agents followed Middlebrooks as he drove a rental car two 
hours from the Cleveland airport to one of the Pittsburgh 
hotels where he had previously met Taylor.  While en route, 
Middlebrooks spoke with Taylor on the phone and stated that 
he “got the car and everything.”  (App. at 624.)  Taylor 
responded by warning Middlebrooks to “keep your eye out.”  
(Id. at 625.)     
 
 In the early morning hours of September 29, 2011, 
DEA agents watched as Taylor arrived at the hotel – again, 
carrying two bags – and joined Middlebrooks.  After 
approximately ten minutes together, Taylor walked out 
without the two bags and returned to his vehicle.  Several 
hours later, Middlebrooks called Taylor and told him that he 
was “on the move.”  (Id. at 669.)  Having wrapped the money 
into nine packets, Middlebrooks left the hotel with a single 
bag containing the cash.  As he proceeded to drive to a truck 
stop in Eighty Four, Pennsylvania, in Washington County – 
the same county where the August 20-21 cocaine transaction 
had occurred – several DEA agents surreptitiously followed 
him.5   
 
 According to the government, once Middlebrooks 
reached the truck stop, the agents were forced to “hang back 
and watch from a distance so as not to blow their cover.”  
                                              
5 Eighty Four is a town in Washington County, 
Pennsylvania, and, by Shannon’s testimony, is also the name 
of the local truck stop.   
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(Gov’t’s Br. at 8.)  From their vantage point, they saw 
Middlebrooks back his vehicle up to a tractor-trailer rig, open 
his trunk, and then hand the bag full of packaged cash to a 
man – later identified as Shannon – standing beside the rig.  
Notably, the agents said that they did not see Middlebrooks 
receive anything in return because their view was partially 
obstructed by a building and various parked trucks.  The next 
thing the agents observed was Middlebrooks getting back into 
his car.  The agents followed him as he rendezvoused with 
Taylor at the same hotel from which he had come.  At that 
point, given that the money had already changed hands, the 
officers moved in to arrest both men.  When Taylor and 
Middlebrooks were taken into custody, each was found with 
three different cell phones on their persons, including a Boost 
Mobile Phone on Middlebrooks.  “[A] black bag containing a 
large amount of cocaine” was also found in the trunk of 
Middlebrooks’s car.  (App. at 801.)   
 
 Back at the truck stop, Shannon stored the bag inside 
the cab of his truck and remained waiting inside the rig. 
According to testimony Shannon later gave on the witness 
stand, he had traveled to Eighty Four, a truck stop he often 
frequented, only as a favor to someone named Phillip 
Williams, a trucker whom he became acquainted with while 
on the road and whom he had occasionally met in Houston.  
Shannon said that Williams had called him to ask whether, as 
a favor, he would pick up someone named “Vince,” another 
trucker, whose vehicle had supposedly broken down in 
Pittsburgh.  Shannon testified that he did not know Vince but 
was willing to oblige Williams’s request because he himself 
had recently been stranded after his own truck broke down 
and he empathized with Vince’s predicament.   According to 
Shannon, he had agreed to meet Vince at Eighty Four – not 
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exactly where Williams had requested, but a familiar haunt to 
Shannon – to give Vince a ride back to Houston.     
 
 But upon meeting “Vince,” who turned out to be 
Middlebrooks, Shannon claimed to be puzzled.  Not only did 
Middlebrooks arrive driving a car, which implied that he was 
in no need of a ride, but he also handed Shannon a bag and 
asked whether he would be willing to wait “about an hour” so 
that he could “take care of some other business.”  (App. at 
1356.)  Shannon testified that he agreed to wait because he 
had already gone out of his way to pick the man up.  After 
some “[t]ime went by,” however, Shannon said he became 
concerned by the situation and opened the bag, worried that 
he might have been handed “dope.”  (Id. at 1357-59.)  
Shannon testified that, when he saw that it was instead cash, 
he “put the money back in the bag[,] ... threw it up under [his] 
bed and got out of [his] truck.”  (Id. at 1359.)  According to 
Shannon, he began walking towards the truck stop’s store to 
call his girlfriend for help.  He was arrested before he reached 
the building.     
 
 Upon a search of Shannon’s vehicle and person, agents 
found the bag, which contained $669,340, as well as $1000 in 
the glove compartment of the truck and three phones – a 
Boost Mobile phone on the truck’s dashboard, an iPhone on 
the ground near where Shannon was arrested, and a Verizon 
Motorola phone.      
 
 On December 14, 2011, a grand jury in the Western 
District of Pennsylvania handed down a superseding 
indictment that, inter alia, charged Shannon, Taylor, and 
Middlebrooks with Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with 
Intent to Distribute Five Kilograms or More of Cocaine, in 
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violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count I), and Distribution and 
Possession with Intent to Distribute Five or More Grams of 
Cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(A)(ii) (Count II).  Both Middlebrooks and Taylor 
pleaded guilty, but Shannon chose to go to trial.   
 
 B. The Trial   
 
 Shannon’s trial strategy was to emphasize that he was 
trying to do someone a favor and that he was simply caught in 
the wrong place at the wrong time.  The government, on the 
other hand, endeavored to prove that he had been a drug 
courier for Middlebrooks since at least late 2009.  To that 
end, the government placed particular focus on the 
circumstances surrounding Shannon’s arrest and its aftermath.  
 
For example, Taylor testified that, when he and 
Shannon were together in pre-trial detention, Shannon 
confessed he had been skimming cash from the proceeds of 
drug deals for some time in order to cover “gas money.”  
(App. at 1007.)  The government argued that such skimming 
would explain the $1000 found in the truck’s glove 
compartment when Shannon was arrested.  Shannon, of 
course, denies that interpretation and maintains that he only 
kept cash in the glove compartment in case of an emergency, 
ever since the trouble he encountered when his truck broke 
down.   
 
Like Taylor and Middlebrooks, Shannon was also 
arrested with three different cell phones on or near his person.  
The government presented testimony that “people who are 
involved in drug trafficking” often have multiple phones, 
including prepaid cell phones like Shannon’s Boost Mobile 
 10 
 
phone, and “everyday” phones like Shannon’s iPhone.  (App. 
at 234, 243.)  The government also confirmed through 
telephone records that Shannon and Middlebrooks each used 
their respective Boost Mobile phones to contact only one 
other such phone, i.e., a companion phone.  In fact, the 
government brought to light that, on multiple occasions, 
including during the August 20-21 and September 29 drug 
deals, signals from Shannon’s and Middlebrooks’s Boost 
Mobile phones were relayed by a cell tower in Eighty Four 
when the phones were used to “chirp”6 their companions.       
 
Shannon tried to explain to the jury why he needed 
three phones.  He said that the Verizon Motorola phone was 
his “everyday” phone and was registered under his name, 
while the iPhone was used solely for “jobs purposes” and was 
registered under his former girlfriend’s name because she had 
better credit than he did at the time it was purchased.   (App. 
at 1404-06.)  As for the third phone, the Boost Mobile phone, 
Shannon claimed that it was purchased in May 2011 as a 
specially dedicated phone for speaking to his nephew Jeremy, 
whom Shannon said he considered as a son.  According to 
Shannon, he bought two Boost Mobile phones in 2011, one 
for him and one for Jeremy, because Boost Mobile offered a 
pre-paid, month-to-month plan with unlimited minutes and 
“chirp” features, and he wanted Jeremy to learn how to 
“handle a phone” and the responsibility of paying for a phone 
before he switched Jeremy to his Verizon Wireless account.   
(App. at 1408.)  Although Shannon admitted that he 
intentionally registered the Boost Mobile phones under a 
                                              
6 “Chirps is the walkie-talkie feature of the Boost 
Mobile phone.”  (App. at 1230.)  
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pseudonym, he said he did so only because he was told that, 
as pre-paid phones, they could be registered under any name.   
 
 Finally, the government confirmed during Shannon’s 
cross-examination that his logbooks – which, as a long-haul 
trucker, he was required to keep by his employer and the 
United States Department of Transportation – were often 
falsified.  From the government’s perspective, Shannon’s 
decision to make “wrong entries” in the logbooks was proof 
that he was not making some side-trip to Eighty Four on the 
day of his arrest but was in fact regularly traveling there, as 
also evidenced by his Boost Mobile phone making use of a 
local cell tower nearly every time Middlebrooks flew into the 
Pittsburgh area.  (App. at 1452.)  Again, Shannon had an 
explanation for the falsified log entries.  He admitted that he 
sometimes lied in his logbook but only to cover up his driving 
to Baltimore to visit his paramour, Mary Simpson.  When 
asked by the government whether he lied in the logbook 
because he could not “put all that driving time down” and still 
do his “real job,” Shannon agreed.  (Id.)   
 
  After Shannon testified about his secret lover 
Simpson, his favor-seeking trucker friend Williams, and his 
beloved nephew Jeremy – all in an effort to explain some of 
the more damning circumstances surrounding his arrest – the 
government took the step that has become the main point of 
contention in this case: it asked him why he had not come 
forward earlier with his exculpatory version of the facts.  
Shannon’s counsel immediately objected to the government’s 
questions, citing the Fifth Amendment, but he was summarily 
overruled.  Shannon was therefore pressed to explain his 
silence.  He did so by saying that he had told his lawyer his 
version of the events in question.   
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 Following closing arguments, and after several hours 
of deliberating, the jury came back and announced it was 
deadlocked.  In response, the District Court gave the jury an 
Allen charge,7 which it claimed was “almost exactly,” if not 
“word-for-word,” the model jury instruction provided in our 
Circuit.  (App. at 1645.)  Shortly thereafter, the jury returned 
and found Shannon guilty on Count I (conspiracy) but not 
guilty on Count II (possession).  Notably, the jury found that 
the government had only proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Shannon was responsible for less than 500 grams of 
cocaine, and so indicated on the verdict slip, which provided 
the option of finding him responsible for more than 5 
kilograms (as alleged in the indictment), more than 500 
grams, or less than 500 grams.  The District Court disagreed, 
however, saying that “there [was] absolutely no evidentiary 
basis to support [the jury’s] finding” of less than 500 grams.  
(App. at 1744.)  It therefore held him accountable for 16 
kilograms of cocaine and sentenced him to 240 months’ 
imprisonment as well as six years of supervised release.        
 
 Shannon timely appealed.   
 
II. DISCUSSION8 
 
                                              
7 See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 497 (1896) 
(approving a supplemental instruction given to encourage a 
deadlocked jury to resolve its differences and reach a verdict).  
8 The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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While Shannon raises several issues on appeal, we 
focus on his Fifth Amendment argument because the 
government’s questioning of Shannon about his post-arrest 
silence is alone enough to require that the conviction be set 
aside.9   
                                              
9 The parties contest whether the District Court 
violated Shannon’s Sixth Amendment rights at sentencing 
and, in that regard, have raised arguments regarding the 
applicability of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 
(2013) (holding that any fact implicating a statutory 
maximum or mandatory minimum sentence is an element of 
an offense that must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt).  We decline to address those and other arguments 
raised by Shannon, since we must vacate his conviction. 
Although we refrain from deciding those remaining 
arguments, we would be remiss if we did not make the 
following observations.  
First, in light of the Court’s finding that Shannon’s two 
prior convictions, both more than twenty years old, could be 
admitted under Rules 404(b) and 609(b) of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence, it is worth noting the narrow purpose and 
specific contours of each rule.  Rule 609, which governs the 
use of convictions as evidence of truthfulness for 
impeachment purposes, limits the admission of a conviction 
more than 10 years old unless “its probative value, supported 
by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs 
its prejudicial effect.”  Fed. R. Evid. 609(b)(1).  The Advisory 
Committee Notes for Rule 609(b) emphasize that 
“convictions over 10 years old will be admitted very rarely 
and only in exceptional circumstances.”  Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) 
advisory committee’s note (emphasis added).  Similarly, 
while Rule 404(b) allows evidence of earlier convictions to be 
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admitted as impeachment evidence “for another purpose” 
besides showing predisposition to commit the crime – such as 
proving “absence of mistake” or “lack of accident” – we have 
held that:  
prior act evidence [under Rule 404(b)] is 
inadmissible unless the evidence is (1) offered 
for a proper non-propensity purpose that is at 
issue in the case; (2) relevant to that identified 
purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 
403 such that its probative value is not 
outweighed by any inherent danger of unfair 
prejudice; and (4) accompanied by a limiting 
instruction, if requested.  
United States v. Caldwell, No. 13-1918, -- F.3d -- , 2014 WL 
3674684, at *7 (3d Cir. July 24, 2014).  Furthermore, we have 
emphasized that the non-propensity “purpose” for which 
404(b) evidence is admitted must be narrowly construed and 
explicitly recorded by the Court.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 443 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that prior 
experience with small amounts of a drug would not have 
provided the requisite knowledge under Rule 404(b) to help a 
defendant identify a large amount of that drug since “[t]he 
packaging or quantity might be different, and objects in 
greater quantities often have an appearance or smell of their 
own”); United States v. Givan, 320 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 
2003) (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(noting that the exception for “absence of mistake” under 
Rule 404(b) requires the government to demonstrate the 
defendant’s same “modus operandi” in a prior crime).  A 
court should hesitate to admit twenty-year-old convictions 
when that evidence looks like propensity evidence.  Under 
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 The guarantee that “[n]o person ... shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” U.S. 
Const. amend. V, is so “fundamental to our system” of 
government that, in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, the Supreme Court established the now-famous 
rule that a defendant must be informed upon arrest that he has 
the right to remain silent.  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68.  
Later, reviewing a prosecution under state law, the Court in 
Doyle v. Ohio announced that, because of the protections of 
                                                                                                     
such circumstances, the evidence must ordinarily be 
excluded.  See United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 887 
(3d Cir. 1992) (“Hence, where the evidence only goes to 
show character, or that the defendant had a propensity to 
commit the crime, it must be excluded.”).  
Second, with respect to the District Court’s Allen 
charge, we reiterate that the Third Circuit Model Criminal 
Jury Instructions are not binding on district courts.  While it 
may often be helpful to use the Model Instructions rather than 
fashioning one’s own, we are not prepared to say that, simply 
because an instruction differs from the model, that instruction 
must be erroneous.  If, on the other hand, an instruction 
“stress[es] the time, expense or burden of a new trial,” the 
instruction would be unduly coercive and would require us to 
vacate a conviction and remand for rehearing.  United States 
v. Jackson, 443 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2006).  The instruction 
at issue here did not stress any of those things, and merely 
mentioning that a case will have to be retried before another 
jury does not constitute coercion.  Nonetheless, a court must 
be careful when highlighting the need to dispose of cases and 
the burden involved in calling a new jury.   
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the Fifth Amendment right to silence, “it would be 
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to 
allow [an] arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an 
explanation subsequently offered at trial.”  426 U.S. 610, 618 
(1976).  The Court therefore held that “the use for 
impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of 
arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 619.  
Of course, the rights secured by Doyle apply in equal effect 
“to federal prosecutions under the Fifth Amendment.”  United 
States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 354 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
 Reiterating the basis for the Doyle rule, as it has now 
come to be called, the Supreme Court has noted that “silence 
[should] carry no penalty” because the primary purpose of 
Miranda warnings is to safeguard an arrested individual’s 
Fifth Amendment right to not speak to law enforcement 
authorities.10  Wainright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 290 
(1986).  When seeking to impeach a defendant’s credibility, a 
prosecutor thus violates the Fifth Amendment when he 
highlights the defendant’s post-arrest silence.11   Gov’t of the 
                                              
10 Silence is not always protected.  A defendant’s pre-
arrest silence is not saved from a prosecutor’s reaches for 
impeachment purposes because “no governmental action 
induce[s] [a] petitioner to remain silent before arrest.”  
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980).   
11 In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926), 
decided decades before Miranda and Doyle, the Supreme 
Court concluded that a defendant “may be examined for the 
purpose of impeaching his credibility” since the Fifth 
Amendment “immunity from giving testimony is one which 
the defendant may waive by offering himself as a witness.” 
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V.I.  v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2009); Hassine v. 
Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 947-49 (3d Cir. 1998).  
 
 A defendant may, however, open himself up to 
questions about his post-arrest silence if he “testifies to an 
exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the 
police the same version upon arrest.”  Hassine, 160 F.3d at 
948 (quoting Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.11) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  In that very limited circumstance, some 
inquiry is permitted to prevent a defendant from misleading a 
fact-finder about his claimed cooperation with law 
enforcement.  But the foundation for such an inquiry is not 
easy to lay.  We have explained that, to open himself up to 
questions about his silence, it is not enough for a defendant’s 
later testimony to be “ambiguous” about his supposed 
cooperation.   Id. at 948 (quoting United States v. Fairchild, 
505 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1975)).  Instead, his earlier 
silence “must appear to be an act blatantly inconsistent with 
... [his] trial testimony.”  Id. (quoting Fairchild, 505 F.2d at 
1382) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 Even when the government wrongly cross-examines a 
defendant about his post-arrest silence, however, that does not 
mean that his conviction will necessarily be infirm.  The error 
may still be harmless.  The operative question becomes 
whether the “constitutional trial error was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  Davis, 561 F.3d at 165 (citing Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  To sustain a 
                                                                                                     
Id. at 496-97.  In light of later precedent, however, that 
conclusion clearly does not apply when a prosecutor 
explicitly questions a defendant’s post-Miranda silence.  
Gov’t of the V.I. v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2009).   
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conviction, the government must “prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.”  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  We have 
previously determined that error of the sort condemned in 
Doyle “may be held harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in 
cases where there is overwhelming evidence against the 
defendant.”  Davis, 561 F.3d at 165.  But it is a “decidedly 
heavy burden ... to demonstrate that reversal is not 
warranted.”  United States v. Waller, 654 F.3d 430, 438 (3d 
Cir. 2011).   
 
A. Objection and Preservation for Appeal12 
 
 As a threshold matter, we must first determine 
whether, under Rule 103(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence,13 Shannon properly objected to the government’s 
cross-examination and preserved that objection so that we can 
exercise plenary review, or whether we must only review the 
alleged Doyle violation for plain error.  We thus turn to the 
record.    
                                              
12 We evaluate de novo a Fifth Amendment violation 
under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), unless the 
defendant failed to object at trial.  Gov’t of the V.I.  v. 
Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010).  In that case, we 
review only for plain error.  United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 
427, 441 (3d Cir. 1996).   
13 Rule 103 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides 
that “[a] party may claim error in a ruling to admit or exclude 
evidence only if the error affects a substantial right of the 
party” and, if the evidence is admitted, the party objecting 
“states the specific ground [for the objection], unless it was 
apparent from the context.”  Fed. R. Evid. 103(a).  
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From a plain reading of the trial transcript, it is clear 
that the government asked Shannon about his post-arrest 
silence.  When Shannon’s counsel attempted to object, he was 
emphatically overruled: 
 
Q: Did you ever direct anyone to come to the 
authorities and say, listen, you need to know about 
[Williams]?  
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, may we have a side-
bar, please?  
THE COURT: No.  
[Defense counsel]: I object to that.  
THE COURT: Overruled, if that’s an objection. 
[Defense counsel]: It’s a comment. 
THE COURT: He’s asking the question.  Did you ever 
tell anybody about Williams.  
   
(App. at 1474.)  Upon being directed by the District Court to 
answer the government’s question, Shannon did answer, but 
his counsel continued objecting and was, again, overruled: 
 
A: I told my lawyer about Williams.  
Q: Did you ever direct anyone to bring that 
information to law enforcement?  
[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, it’s a Fifth 
Amendment comment.  I object.  I would like a 
side-bar.  
THE COURT: You’re overruled. 
A: No. No. 
Q: You waited until you took the stand and then 
you told us about [Simpson, Williams, and 
Middlebrooks]; right?  
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A. Yes, sir. 
[Defense counsel]: I renew my objection, Your 
Honor.   
 
(Id.)   
 
 Defense counsel’s consternation was fully justified, as 
the questions the government asked Shannon are patently 
beyond the bounds set in Doyle.  They are indeed textbook 
examples of a Fifth Amendment violation.  
 
 Notwithstanding the obvious error that the 
government’s questioning created at trial, and despite the 
specific and repeated objections from Shannon’s attorney, the 
government now contends that the objections were 
“insufficient to alert the court of the right he was asserting 
because defense counsel did not even tell the court that 
Shannon had invoked Miranda.”  (Gov’t’s Br. at 22.)  
Repeating that line of attack at oral argument, the government 
claimed that the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) 
who prosecuted the case did not understand Shannon’s 
objection “because frankly Doyle wasn’t mentioned, 
Miranda’s not mentioned.”  (Oral Arg. at 23:48-56.)  The 
government thus asks that we adopt a bright-line rule that 
would require defense counsel to explicitly cite Doyle or its 
progeny when objecting to the government’s questions about 
a defendant’s post-arrest silence, as one of our sister circuits 
has recommended.14  (See Gov’t’s Br. at 22 (“In Shannon’s 
                                              
14 The United States Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in United States v. O’Brien stated that objecting 
counsel should either “point to Doyle or a counterpart case or 
... articulate an objection that was in substance close to the 
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case, defense counsel never mentioned Doyle in the district 
court. ...  This was insufficient to alert the court of the right he 
was asserting because defense counsel did not even tell the 
court that Shannon had invoked Miranda – much less inform 
it that his objection had anything to do with Miranda – until 
after the trial was over.”).)  We decline that invitation.   
 
 To begin with, the government’s claim that it did not 
understand the objection is belied by the record.  Besides the 
fact that defense counsel explicitly stated the grounds for his 
objection as being based on the Fifth Amendment, the 
colloquy among the AUSA, defense counsel, and the District 
Court after the defense rested makes clear that the 
government understood the nature of Shannon’s objection.  
Before closing arguments, defense counsel asked that the 
District Court provide “a very intense cautionary instruction 
on the government comment on my client’s silence.”  (App. 
at 1489.)  When the Court replied that Shannon “waive[d] 
[his] Fifth Amendment rights when [he] t[ook] the witness 
stand,” defense counsel rightly corrected the Court and 
explained that taking the witness stand does not waive a 
defendant’s right to be free of questioning about his post-
arrest silence.  (Id.)  While the government now pleads 
                                                                                                     
rationale of Doyle” to preserve the objection.  O’Brien, 435 
F.3d 36, 39 (1st Cir. 2006).  What appears to have motivated 
the court in O’Brien, however, was the fact that defense 
counsel in that case gave “the wrong ground” for an 
objection.  Id.  That is not the case here.   Shannon’s counsel 
clearly objected and said, “Fifth Amendment comment.”  
(App. at 1475.) 
 
 22 
 
ignorance, the AUSA arguing before the District Court 
apparently understood that defense counsel was objecting to 
the inquiry into post-arrest silence.  In fact, the AUSA 
responded by stating that “[o]nce [the defendant] gets on the 
witness stand and presents his side of the story, he’s putting 
that out there and he waited a year to do that.”  (Id. at 1489-
90.)  Although defense counsel continued disputing the 
propriety of the government’s inquiry into Shannon’s silence, 
the District Court declined to give any curative or cautionary 
instruction.     
 
 Given that background, it beggars belief to hear the 
government now argue that the Fifth Amendment issue was 
not preserved for review.  It was preserved, and the argument 
to the contrary actually borders on frivolous.  We therefore 
will review the issue de novo and not, as the government 
requests, for plain error.  Gov’t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 620 
F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010).    
 
B. Opening the Door  
 
The government next argues that, even if the objection 
was preserved for plenary review, the AUSA’s questions 
were appropriate and did not constitute a Doyle violation 
because Shannon “opened the door by implying he had 
cooperated in an investigation to find [Williams]” and 
because “most of the prosecutor’s questions probed 
Shannon’s pre-arrest failure to call police when [he] realized 
Middlebrooks handed him dope’ or drug-money.” 15  (Gov’t’s 
                                              
15 We focus our analysis on those questions the 
government asked Shannon during cross-examination.  The 
government notes that the “AUSA said nothing about 
 23 
 
Br. at 20-21.)  The government points to Shannon testifying 
that he had “tried to ‘find [Williams,]” and it says he “twice 
implied that his efforts ... were undertaken in cooperation 
with authorities.”  (Id. at 27 (citing App. at 1388, 1399).)  If 
Shannon had not been working with authorities, the 
government asks, “why else [would he be] … trying to find 
[Williams]?”  (Oral Arg. at 18:11-13.)  The government 
contends that Shannon waived his Fifth Amendment rights as 
explained in Doyle because a “defendant who wishes to 
protect his post-arrest silence cannot ‘imply that he had 
participated actively in the investigation.’”  (Gov’t’s Br. at 28 
(quoting Hassine, 160 F.3d at 949).)   
 
On this point, as on the earlier question of whether the 
Fifth Amendment issue was preserved by appropriate 
objection at trial, the government’s arguments strike us as 
badly strained.  The record simply does not reveal any 
“opening of the door” to allow questioning about Shannon’s 
post-arrest silence.  Here is the exchange the government 
relies on:    
                                                                                                     
Shannon’s silence in his [initial] closing argument” (Gov’t’s 
Br. at 29) until Shannon’s closing emphasized that the 
government did not “negate the legitimacy of [Shannon’s] 
story regarding why he went to Baltimore and that his 
nephew, like a son for him, ... wanted to get a phone.”  (App. 
at 1607 (Appellant Closing Statement).)  Even assuming that 
sequence forgave the comments at closing, it is irrelevant to 
the question of whether the government violated Shannon’s 
Fifth Amendment rights under Doyle during its cross-
examination.   
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[AUSA]: Have you looked at those phone 
records? 
A: We looked at them.  Me and my counsel went 
over the phone records.  Keep in mind it was, 
what, eight, nine months had passed by.  I 
looked at the phone records and tried, to the best 
of my knowledge, give the phone that I thought 
was [Williams’s].  They took the phone, 
investigated it.  Several phones that people call 
me, the numbers was dislocated. Other phone 
numbers that they called people would know me, 
but didn’t know ... Williams.  And when we 
finally got a phone number that I thought was 
his, it was actually a guy that works on cars, 
works at Meineke.  Meineke Mufflers. 
Q: You looked at the phone records because you 
know [Williams’] number has to be on that; 
right? 
A:  Yes.  It has to be on there. 
Q: It has to be on the Verizon phone records? 
A:  Yes, sir. 
Q: And so, you looked at them and you can’t find 
[Williams’] number? 
A: No, sir.  I can’t remember his number because I 
didn’t have it locked in. 
Q: When you say you didn’t have it locked in, 
you didn’t have it saved in your contacts? 
A: Didn’t have it saved in my phone.  Yes, sir. 
 
(App. at 1416-17.)   
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There is nothing in that exchange or elsewhere in the 
record that can reasonably be construed as Shannon waiving 
his Fifth Amendment rights.  Shannon did not “trumpet[] his 
post-arrest cooperation,” as the government claims.  (Gov’t’s 
Br. at 26.)  On the contrary, he told the government only what 
he and his defense team undertook to corroborate his story.  
While the government asserts that Shannon’s reference to 
“they” is a reference to the government, the transcript cannot 
comfortably bear that interpretation.  (Id. at 27-28.)  Shannon 
appears to be referring to the defense team reviewing his 
phone usage, not to any investigation by the government.   
 
The government also claims that Shannon first 
intimated his cooperation when he prefaced an answer about 
Williams with the phrase “like I tell you earlier,” as if 
“earlier” meant pre-trial and referred to working with the 
government.  (App. at 1400.)  But in that portion of his 
testimony Shannon was plainly not referring to pre-trial 
communications with the government but to a statement in 
Court he had made only moments earlier that he had met 
Williams at a restaurant in Houston.16  It is frankly painful to 
watch the government’s labored wresting of selected 
sentences from Shannon’s testimony in an effort to create an 
impression which a straightforward reading of the record 
refutes.  We are left to agree with Shannon that the 
government’s arguments are nothing more than a “post hoc 
attempt to salvage an unsalvageable mistake made by the trial 
prosecutor.”  (Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14.)     
                                              
16 Shannon testified, “I wouldn’t get in touch with him.  
I would if, like I tell you earlier, I would see him at the place 
called the Boiling Crab on different occasions.”  (App. at 
1400.)   
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We have searched the record in vain for evidence that 
Shannon’s silence was “blatantly inconsistent with [his] trial 
testimony,” as required by Hassine to render permissible the 
kinds of questions the government asked.  160 F.3d at 948-49 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The 
government argues that the “blatant inconsistency ... is that 
[Shannon] says he’s trying to find [Williams, telling several 
people his version of the story], but then he doesn’t convey 
information to those people which would enable them to help 
him or do anything.”  (Oral Arg. at 18:51-19:09.)  But that 
argument shows that government’s counsel still does not 
appreciate the import of Doyle.  The government should 
know that Shannon does not need to “convey” information to 
anyone; beyond question, he has no responsibility to prove 
his innocence.  And it should also recognize that there was 
nothing in Shannon’s testimony that was “blatantly 
inconsistent” with his post-arrest silence.  The government 
conceded as much at oral argument when it characterized as 
“vague” Shannon’s responses regarding who he might have 
been working with to find Williams.  (Oral Arg. at 20:01-03.)  
“Vague” obviously does not reach the high threshold of 
“blatantly inconsistent.”  If Doyle means anything, it is what 
is said in its very first paragraph: that it is a violation of a 
defendant’s due process rights for a “prosecutor ... to impeach 
a defendant’s exculpatory story, told for the first time at trial, 
by cross-examining the defendant about his failure to have 
told the story after receiving Miranda warnings at the time of 
his arrest.”  Doyle, 426 U.S. at 611 (footnote omitted).  That 
is precisely what happened here.  
 
The government’s second argument – that “most of the 
prosecutor’s questions probed Shannon’s pre-arrest failure to 
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call police” – is also a stretch of the record.  (Gov’t’s Br. at 
21.)  Very few questions in that cross-examination addressed 
Shannon’s pre-arrest failure:   
 
Q: When you see it’s money, you panic? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: You don’t call the police; do you? 
A: No, sir.  I don’t call the police. 
Q: You instead think, I'm going to get out of my 
car, maybe I’ll call Quita?  
A: Yes, sir. 
 
(App. at 1448.)  The government’s questions about post-arrest 
silence were also limited, consisting of the following: (1) 
“Did you ever direct anyone to come to the authorities and 
say, listen, you need to know about ... Williams?”; and (2) 
“You waited until you took the stand and then you told us 
about [Simpson, Williams, and Middlebrooks]; right?”  (App. 
at 1475.)  The government’s implication that the questioning 
about Shannon’s silence was largely innocuous because it 
focused on Shannon’s pre-arrest silence does not accord with 
the reality that both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence received 
roughly the same degree of inquiry.  More to the point, the 
number of questions the government asked is not relevant to 
the inquiry before us.  Even if the government had, in fact, 
asked pages of questions regarding Shannon’s pre-arrest 
silence, the problem remains that it also asked inappropriate 
questions regarding Shannon’s post-arrest silence.  Doyle 
does not establish a threshold quantity of improper 
questioning to qualify as a constitutional violation.  Here, the 
two questions asked by the government regarding Shannon’s 
post-arrest silence violated his Fifth Amendment right to 
silence, as explained in Doyle.  
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 C. Harmless Error Analysis  
 
Our analysis, however, does not end with the finding 
of a constitutional error at trial.  We must still determine 
whether the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained.17  
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  When the government fails to 
carry its burden of proof, we must vacate the judgment of 
conviction and remand for a new trial.  That is the result 
required here.  
 
Viewed in its totality, the evidence against Shannon 
was largely circumstantial and not “overwhelming,” as 
required by Davis.18  561 F.3d at 165.  “The government 
                                              
17 The government argues that Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619 (1993), is instructive, but, as the government 
itself notes, “Brecht was decided on collateral rather than 
direct review” (Gov’t’s Br. at 32 (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 
637-38 (holding that constitutional error is harmful under 
collateral review when that error “had substantial and 
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s 
verdict”))), and consequently is irrelevant to our analysis.   
18 We are not implying, of course, that the evidence 
against him was insignificant.  It certainly was not.  The 
government presented the following persuasive evidence at 
trial: Shannon’s Boost Mobile phone chirped in Eighty Four 
virtually every time Middlebrooks visited Pittsburgh.  
Shannon was entrusted with $669,340 to hold for the 
conspiracy, despite, according to him, being a complete 
stranger to that conspiracy.  And Shannon falsified his 
logbooks, a violation of federal law in its own right, to hide 
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conducted months of investigation, listened to thousands of 
hours of wiretaps, [and] yet had not once heard of Shannon.”  
(Appellant’s Opening Br. at 26.)  Not one government record 
revealed a call, text, or even an email between Shannon and 
anybody else involved in the conspiracy.  Without more in the 
way of corroborating evidence linking Shannon to the 
conspiracy, the jury’s assessment of Shannon’s credibility 
was likely important to the outcome of the case.19  Because 
that credibility was undermined by the government’s 
questioning of Shannon about why he had not come forward 
earlier to the police, we cannot say the constitutional error 
was harmless.  Chapman mandates that the government must 
“prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained 
of did not contribute to the verdict obtained,” 386 U.S. at 24, 
but the government has not done so, and the verdict cannot 
stand.    
                                                                                                     
frequent trips, that, perhaps by sheer coincidence, had him 
driving through Eighty Four on multiple occasions.  Although 
such evidence may well be sufficient to convict, it is not 
enough to sustain a conviction when, as in this case, there has 
been a Fifth Amendment violation and the case depends so 
heavily on whether one believes the defendant’s story.  
19 In the past, we have found “harmless error” in 
limited circumstances where the government presented 
additional corroborating evidence at trial.  See Davis, 561 
F.3d at 166.  In United States v. Balter, 91 F.3d 427, 431 (3d 
Cir. 1996), for example, the government offered taped 
conversations substantiating its theory of the case.  Similarly, 
in United States v. Dunbar, 767 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1985), 
two bank tellers separately identified the defendant after a 
surveillance camera captured pictures of him robbing a bank.  
Here, the government has offered no such evidence.   
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s judgment and remand for a new trial consistent with 
this opinion.    
